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In July 1959, the Finnish Prime Minister, V. J. Sukselainen, stood at a meeting 
of Nordic leaders and announced a desire to join the free trade area then being 
discussed between Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and 
Switzerland.1 That an outsider appeared keen to accede at so early a stage in their 
QHJRWLDWLRQVZDVVXSHU¿FLDOO\DWOHDVWLPPHQVHO\ÀDWWHULQJIRUµWKH6HYHQ¶$VWKH 
Observer’s(FRQRPLF(GLWRUSXWLWDQ\PHPEHUVKLSELGZRXOGµDGGWRWKHSUHVWLJH¶
of an organisation that was still formally to be established.2 As would quickly 
EHFRPHDSSDUHQWKRZHYHU)LQODQG¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQZKDWZRXOGVRRQEHFRPHWKH
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) also presented numerous and potentially 
insurmountable challenges. These ranged from somewhat mundane technical 
TXHVWLRQVRYHU)LQODQG¶V WDUL൵SROLF\DQGOLQJHULQJGRXEWVDERXW WKHFRPSDWLELOLW\
of its economy with membership of a regional free trade pact, to the far more critical 
IDFWWKDWWKH6RYLHW8QLRQKDGDQRWLQFRQVLGHUDEOHLQÀXHQFHRYHUWKHZKROHWHQRURI
Finnish domestic and foreign politics. And yet despite all these hurdles, by June 1961 
Finland was nonetheless able to take up its position in EFTA as an associate member.
,QVXFKFLUFXPVWDQFHVLWLVQRWHQWLUHO\VXUSULVLQJWKDW)LQODQG¶VSDWKWR()7$KDV




DQG WKH HTXDOO\ SUHVVLQJ QHHG WR UHPDLQ FRPSHWLWLYH E\ HQWHULQJ DQ\ SUHIHUHQWLDO
trade arrangement containing Norway and Sweden, both of which like Finland were 
1  For the speech see Gunnar Lange, “Welcome for a Nordic Partner”. EFTA Bulletin, Volume 2, 
Number 4, April 1961, 3. 
2  (FRQRPLF(GLWRU³,QQHU3ODQIRU2XWHU6HYHQ´7KH2EVHUYHU
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PDMRU H[SRUWHUV RI ZRRGZRUNLQJ DQG SDSHU SURGXFWV3 7KH H[WDQW KLVWRULRJUDSK\
OLNHZLVHPHDQVZHKDYHDYHU\FOHDU VHQVHRIZKDWPLJKWEH WHUPHG WKH VHFXULW\
LPSHUDWLYH RI )LQODQG¶V (XURSHDQ SROLF\$IWHU DOO )LQODQG ZDV D FRXQWU\ ZKRVH
QHXWUDOLW\ZDVKLJKO\GHSHQGHQWRQJRRGQHLJKERXUUHODWLRQVZLWKWKH6RYLHW8QLRQ
That Moscow was initially at least rather cool towards Finnish participation in EFTA 
± D WKHPHGHYHORSHG IXUWKHU EHORZ± WKXVREOLJHG WKHJRYHUQPHQW LQ+HOVLQNL WR
FRQVLGHUZD\VRIPRYLQJFORVHUWRWKH$VVRFLDWLRQZLWKRXWGLVWXUELQJWKLVQHXWUDOLW\
RUIXQGDPHQWDOO\MHRSDUGLVLQJLWVH[LVWLQJWUDGHZLWKWKH(DVWHUQEORF4 
,Q FRQFHQWUDWLQJ VR VLQJO\ RQ WKH )LQQLVK SRLQW RI YLHZ KRZHYHUZKDW WKRVH




RI WKH LQLWLDO UHOXFWDQFH E\ VRPH %ULWLVK R൶FLDOV QRW OHDVW WKRVH FKDUJHG ZLWK
3  0RVWREYLRXVO\.ODXV7|UQXGG ³)LQODQGDQG(FRQRPLF ,QWHJUDWLRQ LQ(XURSH´Cooperation 
DQG&RQÀLFW9ROXPH1XPEHU±6HHDOVR(VNR$QWROD³)LQODQG´The Wider 
Western Europe: Reshaping the EC/EFTA Relationship (GLWHG E\ +HOHQ :DOODFH 3LQWHU
/RQGRQ  (VNR $QWROD DQG 2VVL 7XXVYXRUL Länsi-Euroopan integraatio ja Suomi. 
8ONRSROLLWWLQHQ LQVWLWXXWWL +HOVLQNL  -XKDQD$XQHVOXRPD Vapaakaupan tiellä. Suomen 
kauppa- ja integraatiopolitiikka maailmansodista EU-aikaan 6.6 +HOVLQNL  ±
5LLWWD+MHUSSH³)LQODQG¶V)RUHLJQ7UDGHDQG7UDGH3ROLF\ LQ WKHth Century”. 6FDQGLQDYLDQ
Journal of History9ROXPH1R±7DSDQL3DDYRQHQ³)LQODQGDQGWKH4XHVWLRQ
RI:HVW(XURSHDQ(FRQRPLF,QWHJUDWLRQ±´6FDQGLQDYLDQ(FRQRPLF+LVWRU\5HYLHZ, 
9ROXPH1XPEHU±±-XNND6HSSLQHQSuomen Efta-ratkaisu yöpakkasten ja 
noottikriisin välissä. 6XRPHQ+LVWRULDOOLQHQ6HXUD+HOVLQNL
4  Esko Antola, “The Finnish Integration Strategy: Adaptation with Restrictions”. )DFLQJ WKH
Change in Europe: EFTA Countries’ Integration Strategies(GLWHGE\.DUL0|WW|OlDQG+HLNNL
3DWRPlNL ),,$ +HOVLQNL  +DUWR +DNRYLUWD ³3XROXHHWWRPXXV MD LQWHJUDDWLRSROLWLLNND
7XWNLPXV SXROXHHWWRPDQ YDOWLRQ DGDSWDDWLRVWD DOXHHOOLVHHQ LQWHJUDDWLRRQ WHRULDQ YHUWDLOXMHQ
MD 6XRPHQ SRLNNHDYDQ WDSDXNVHQ YDORVVD´ 8QSXEOLVKHG 3K' 8QLYHUVLW\ RI 7DPSHUH 
+DUWR +DNRYLUWD ³7KH 1RUGLF 1HXWUDOV LQ:HVWHUQ (XURSHDQ ,QWHJUDWLRQ´Cooperation and 
&RQÀLFW 9ROXPH  1XPEHU   ± 7RQL0XRVHUFinnlands Neutralität und die 
(XURSlLVFKH :LUWVFKDIWVLQWHJUDWLRQ. Nomos, %DGHQ%DGHQ  7DSDQL 3DDYRQHQ ³)URP
,VRODWLRQ WR WKH &RUH )LQODQG¶V 3RVLWLRQ WRZDUGV (XURSHDQ ,QWHJUDWLRQ ±´ Journal 
of European Integration History9ROXPH1XPEHU   ± -RKDQQD5DLQLR1LHPL
7KH,GHRORJLFDO&ROG:DU7KH3ROLWLFVRI1HXWUDOLW\LQ$XVWULDDQG)LQODQG. Routledge, New 
<RUN DQG /RQGRQ  ± +DQQX 5DXWNDOOLR Kekkonen ja Moskova. Suomi lännestä 
nähtynä 1956–1962. .XVWDQQXVRVDNH\KWL|7DPPL+HOVLQNL7LPR6RLNNDQHQ3UHVLGHQWLQ
ministeriö. Ulkoasiainhallinto ja ulkopolitiikan hoito Kekkosen kaudella I. Kansainvälistymisen 
ja muutosvaatimusten paineessa 1956–1969. 8ONRDVLDLQPLQLVWHUL|+HOVLQNL
5  0LNDHODI0DOPERUJ³6ZHGLVK1HXWUDOLW\WKH)LQODQG$UJXPHQWDQGWKH(QODUJHPHQWRIµ/LWWOH
(XURSH¶´ Journal of European Integration History9ROXPH1XPEHU±
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QHJRWLDWLQJ()7$HYHQWRFRXQWHQDQFHEURDGHQLQJWKHJURXSWRLQFOXGHWKH)LQQV6 
&RPSDUDWLYHO\IHZKLVWRULDQVKDYHQRQHWKHOHVVJRQHRQWRH[SODLQZK\GHVSLWHWKLV
HDUO\QHJDWLYLW\ IURP WKH%ULWLVKDQG WKHPDJQLWXGHRI WKHREVWDFOHVSUHVHQWHGE\
WKH)LQQLVK DSSOLFDWLRQ DOO VHYHQ()7$ IRXQGHUPHPEHUV FKRVH¿QDOO\ WR DFFHSW
)LQODQGLQWRWKHLUIROG1RFRPSOHWHH[SODQDWLRQRIKRZDQGZK\WKLVZDVWKHFDVH
LVLQIDFWSRVVLEOHZLWKRXWWDFNOLQJWKHWRSLFIURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRI()7$LWVHOIDQG





LV LQ WXUQ WKH UROH SOD\HG E\ WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV ,W LV DOUHDG\ZHOO NQRZQ WKDW WKH
$PHULFDQVKDGORQJWDNHQDQLQWHUHVW LQWKHKHDOWKRI)LQQLVKVRYHUHLJQW\DQGWKH
UHODWLYH LQÀXHQFH H[HUFLVHG E\ WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ RYHU VXFFHVVLYH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQV
LQ+HOVLQNL$Q\GHYHORSPHQWZKLFK DVZLWK()7$EURXJKW WR WKH IRUH WKH WZLQ





It is, then, upon the relationship between Finland and EFTA, the internal EFTA 
deliberations on the subject of Finnish membership, and the way such discussions 
SOD\HG RXW ZLWKLQ WKH ZLGHU FRQWH[W RI WUDQVDWODQWLF UHODWLRQV ZKLFK WKH SUHVHQW
article intends to concentrate. In so doing, the opening section of the article will 
¿UVWUHFDOOWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOSRVLWLRQLQZKLFK)LQODQGIRXQGLWVHOIE\DQGWKHQ




H[SUHVVHG E\ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV ± ZKR VDZ )LQODQG¶V VWDWXV DV DQ LQGHSHQGHQW
FRXQWU\DVLQFUHDVLQJO\DWULVNDPLGDIUHH]HLQ)LQQR6RYLHWUHODWLRQVDQGDEURDGHU
worsening of East-West relations. The latter part of the article will in turn ask how 
these apprehensions, which translated into a preference for Finland to join EFTA 
DVDZD\RIVKLHOGLQJLWIURP6RYLHWSUHVVXUHSOD\HGRXWDPRQJWKH6HYHQDVWKH\
6  ,ELG6HSSLQHQ1LNODV -HQVHQ(ULNVHQ ³0DUNHW&RPSHWLWRURU%DWWOH¿HOG"%ULWLVK








+RZGLG WKH6HYHQ JUDSSOHZLWK WKH SROLWLFDO DQG ORJLVWLFDO KXUGOHV SUHVHQWHG E\
)LQODQG¶V SUHVXPSWLYH PHPEHUVKLS WKDW EHFDPH RQO\ PRUH SURQRXQFHG DV WKH
QHJRWLDWLRQVFRQWLQXHG"$QGZKDW UROHGLG WKH WUDQVDWODQWLFQH[XVSOD\ LQKHOSLQJ
WR VPRRWK)LQODQG¶VSDWK WR()7$" ,QRUGHU WRDQVZHU VXFKTXHVWLRQV WKHDUWLFOH
GUDZVRQ()7$¶VRZQSDSHUVKRXVHGDWWKH$VVRFLDWLRQ¶VKHDGTXDUWHUVLQ*HQHYD
WKH()7$FROOHFWLRQEDVHGDWWKH(XURSHDQ8QLYHUVLW\,QVWLWXWH(8,LQ)ORUHQFH
DQGWKH$PHULFDQ6WDWH'HSDUWPHQW¶VForeign Relations of the United States )586
VHULHVVXSSOHPHQWHGZKHUHDSSURSULDWHE\UHIHUHQFHVWRWKHQDWLRQDODUFKLYHVRINH\
member states.
Sitting awkwardly between West and East
7KH EDVLF VKDSH RI )LQODQG¶V IRUHLJQ HFRQRPLF SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH VZDV IRUJHG
GXULQJDIUHQHWLFSHULRGRIQHJRWLDWLRQVZLWK WKH6RYLHW8QLRQWKDWVWUHWFKHGIURP





&RQWLQXDWLRQ:DU DQG WKH3DULV3HDFH7UHDWLHV VLJQHG LQ)HEUXDU\SODFHGD
SUHPLXPRQ¿QDQFLDOUHVWLWXWLRQDERYHPXFKHOVH7KHJRYHUQPHQWLQ+HOVLQNLZRXOG
DGPLWWHGO\ QHHG WR DWRQH IRU LWV ZDUWLPH1D]L DOOHJLDQFH OHJDOLVH WKH SUHYLRXVO\
RXWODZHG)LQQLVKFRPPXQLVWSDUW\DQGFHGHWHUULWRULHVVXFKDV.DUHOLDDVSDUWRID
UHGUDZLQJRIWKH5XVVR)LQQLVKERUGHU6RWRRGLGWKH6RYLHWVH[SHFW)LQODQGWRDFW










from further research in Austrian, Swiss, Portuguese and Norwegian collections. 
9  )RUDQRYHUYLHZVHHLH$QWKRQ\8SWRQ³)LQODQG*UHDW%ULWDLQDQGWKH&ROG:DU±´
(GLWHG E\ -XKDQD $XQHVOXRPD 6XRPDODLVHQ .LUMDOOLVXXGHQ 6HXUD +HOVLQNL  7XRPR
3ROYLQHQ%HWZHHQ(DVW DQG:HVW)LQODQG LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO3ROLWLFV±8QLYHUVLW\RI
0LQQHVRWD3UHVV0LQQHDSROLV01
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HOHFWHGWRUHMHFW0DUVKDOO$LGIRUIHDURIDQWDJRQLVLQJWKH6RYLHWOHDGHUVKLS The 
IRXQGDWLRQV RI )LQODQG¶V IXWXUH WUDGH WLHV ZLWK WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ ZHUH WKHQ ODLG
a few months later with the signing of the Treaty of Commerce. At its core this 




the FCMA added a strategic dimension to the relationship.12 None of this admittedly 
meant Finland was any less determined to build closer economic and trade ties with 
the West. Indeed, the Finns signalled early on that their rejection of American dollar 
aid should not be allowed to interfere with its seat in the International Monetary Fund 





UHVWUDLQHGE\WKHQHHGWRNHHSRXWRIDQ\µJUHDWSRZHU¶FRQIURQWDWLRQV14 Not only 
GLGWKLVIDFWHQKDQFH6RYLHWSROLWLFDOOHYHUDJHRYHU)LQQLVKSROLWLFVXQGHUWKHJXLVH
RI µGHIHQGLQJ¶DJDLQVW WKUHDWV WR LWVRZQVRYHUHLJQW\EXW LW DOVRDOOEXWSUHFOXGHG
Finland from tightening bonds with those international organisations judged inimical 
WR6RYLHWLQWHUHVWV,QWKLVFDOFXODWLRQWKH,0)DQG*$77ZHUHERWKWROHUDEOHDVORRVH
  0LNNR0DMDQGHU³7KH/LPLWVRI6RYHUHLJQW\)LQODQGDQGWKH4XHVWLRQRIWKH0DUVKDOO3ODQLQ








13  (UNNL 0lHQWDNDQHQ ³:HVWHUQ DQG (DVWHUQ (XURSH LQ )LQQLVK 7UDGH 3ROLF\ ±´
&RRSHUDWLRQ DQG &RQÀLFW 9ROXPH   ± KHUH  7DSDQL 3DDYRQHQ ³1HXWUDOLW\
3URWHFWLRQLVP DQG WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RPPXQLW\´ 6FDQGLQDYLDQ (FRQRPLF +LVWRU\ 5HYLHZ
9ROXPH1XPEHU±KHUH±





7KH LPSOLFDWLRQV RI DOO WKLV LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI ()7$ ZHUH DW OHDVW WKUHHIROG
)RU D VWDUW LW PHDQW WKDW WKH )LQQLVK ZHUH H[FOXGHG IURP WKH 2UJDQLVDWLRQ IRU
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which administered Marshall Aid. One 
implication of this emerged in the autumn of 1956 when Britain launched plans to 
FUHDWHZLWKLQWKHFRQ¿QHVRIWKH2((&DQLQGXVWULDOIUHHWUDGHDUHD±WKHVRFDOOHG
)7$±FRPSULVLQJDOOVHYHQWHHQRILWVPHPEHUVLQFOXGLQJWKHVL[QDWLRQVWKHQVWLOO






had been so determined quickly to construct a new, smaller free trade bloc. Such 
a task was made immeasurably easier since so many of the technical questions 
WKDWPLJKWRWKHUZLVHKDYHGRJJHG()7$¶VIRXQGLQJQHJRWLDWLRQVKDG ODUJHO\EHHQ
LURQHGRXWGXULQJWKHHDUOLHU)7$HSLVRGH)RU)LQODQGKRZHYHULWVDEVHQFHIURP
WKH2((&DQG WKXV WKH)7$QHJRWLDWLRQV LQHYLWDEO\PHDQW WKLVZDV QRW WKH FDVH
7KLVOHGWKH%ULWLVKWRFRQFOXGHWKDWDQ\)LQQLVKSUHVHQFHZRXOGRQO\µFRPSOLFDWH¶
WKH SURJUHVV RI WKH 6HYHQ¶V WDONV DV WKH\ IRUPDOO\ JRW XQGHUZD\ LQ 6DOWVM|EDGHQ
on the outskirts of Stockholm from July 1959. There was a certain logic to this 
British timidity. If nothing else, a Finnish application might well trigger a host of 
VLPLODUµSHULSKHUDO¶ELGVWKHUHE\WXUQLQJ()7$IURPDSUDFWLFDOEDVLVRIWDONVZLWK
WKH6L[WRDQRUJDQLVDWLRQFRQVXPHGE\WKHLVVXHRIHQODUJHPHQW,UHODQG7XUNH\DQG









±5DOI7|UQJUHQ³7KH1HXWUDOLW\RI)LQODQG´)RUHLJQ$ৼDLUV, Volume 39. Number 
±
16  7KH6L[UHIHUVWR%HOJLXP)UDQFH*HUPDQ\,WDO\/X[HPERXUJDQGWKH1HWKHUODQGV
  On the collapse of the FTA, among others, James Ellison, Threatening Europe: Britain and the 
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H[LVWLQJVLJQDWRULHVWRWKH2((&19%\FRQWUDVW)LQODQG¶VµDORRIQHVV¶IURPFHUWDLQ
Western integration schemes meant it was something of an unknown quantity to 
EFTA members like Austria and Portugal.
7KH VHFRQG UHDVRQ WKDW WKLV FRQWH[W PDWWHUV UHODWHV WR WKH W\SH RI HFRQRPLF
PRGHOWKDW+HOVLQNLZRXOGJRRQWRGHYHORSRYHUWKHFRXUVHRIWKHV3DUWRI
WKHSUREOHPZDVVLPSO\WKDW)LQODQG¶VGHFLVLRQWRUHPRYHLWVHOIIURPPDQ\RIWKH





Finno-EFTA trade meant that accession to the Association would require Finland to 
RSHQ LWV HFRQRP\ WR:HVWHUQ FRPSHWLWLRQPXFK IXUWKHU WKDQKDGSUHYLRXVO\EHHQ
WKHFDVH$VWKLQJVVWRRG)LQODQGPDLQWDLQHGDKLJKWDUL൵UHJLPHRIDWOHDVWSHU
FHQWRQLQGXVWULHVOLNHVLONUXEEHUJODVVDQGZRRODVZHOODVH[WHQVLYHTXRWDVIRU






LWZHUHPRVW DSSDUHQWZKHQ LW FDPH WR WKH SRUWLRQ RI WKH)LQQR6RYLHW7UHDW\ RI






(6(,&RQYHQWLRQ 5HYLVH  7  71$ 7KH +DQGOLQJ RI WKH )LQQLVK
$SSOLFDWLRQLQ6WRFNKROPXQGDWHG771$
  ,ELG)RUWKHLGHDRI)LQQLVKµDORRIQHVV¶VHH7|UQXGG
21  $VVRFLDWLRQ RI )LQODQGZLWK ()7$1RWH E\ WKH 6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO WR+HDGV RI'HOHJDWLRQV
()7$6*1()7$+$(8
22  -HQVHQ(ULNVHQ  7DSDQL 3DDYRQHQThe FINN-EFTA Agreement (1961) as a Turning 
3RLQWLQWKH)LQQLVK)RUHLJQ(FRQRPLF3ROLF\. Turun yliopisto, Turku 1991. 
23  /LVWRI*RRGVZKLFK)LQODQG:LVKHVWR3URORQJ3HULRGVRI7UDQVLWLRQ()7$$SSHQGL[
XQGDWHG()7$+$(8)2WR+HOVLQNLWHOQR771$
24  7KH0)1 SULQFLSOH D YLWDO FRPSRQHQW RI SRVW JOREDO UHODWLRQV GHYLVHG ODUJHO\ WR VWRS
WKHUHWXUQWRWKHELODWHUDOLVPDQGSURWHFWLRQLVPRIWKHVVRXJKWWRSUHYHQWVWDWHVJUDQWLQJ
IDYRXUDEOHWUDGHWHUPVVXFKWKHUHPRYDORIWDUL൵VRQFHUWDLQJRRGVWRRQHRILWVSDUWQHUVZKLOH
discriminating against another. For more see Gerard Curzon, 0XOWLODWHUDO&RPPHUFLDO'LSORPDF\. 





PDUNHWV WDUL൵IUHHZLWKRXW UHFLSURFDODFFHVV IRU WKHLURZQSURGXFWV25 If this were 
not already problematic enough, any sense that EFTA states regarded this acceptable 
was thought likely to undermine the ability of its three neutral members – Austria, 
6ZHGHQ DQG 6ZLW]HUODQG ± WR ZLWKVWDQG VLPLODU UHTXHVWV IURP 6RYLHW OHDGHUV DQ
outcome which if left unchecked could see all three increase their economic, and 
SHUKDSVHYHQWXDOO\SROLWLFDOUHOLDQFHRQWKH6RYLHW8QLRQ26 What was more, in order 
to remain compliant Finland would be obliged to grant to GATT as a whole the 










ZHOO DFW DV D µ5XVVLDQ7URMDQ KRUVH¶ Austria matched Swiss unease. According 
WR -RKDQQ$XJHQWKDOHU D FLYLO VHUYDQW GUDZQ IURP WKH)HGHUDO0LQLVWU\ RI7UDGH
DQG5HFRQVWUXFWLRQLQ9LHQQDWKH6RYLHW8QLRQKDGDOUHDG\ZHOFRPHG()7$DVD
method of splitting European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
1$72 LQWR WZR ULYDO EORFV 7R WKLV HQG )LQODQG¶V MRLQLQJ ()7$ ZDV WKRXJKW




seemed unwilling for it to take the same approach.
26  (XURSHDQ)UHH7UDGH$UHD6WHHULQJ*URXS1RWHRI0HHWLQJ*(1QG0HHW-
LQJ&$%71$
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political relations in Western Europe still further.294XHVWLRQDEOHRIFRXUVHLVTXLWH
KRZ DFFXUDWH ZDV WKLV SUHOLPLQDU\ UHDGLQJ RI HYHQWV 7KDW3UDYGD had issued a 
WKLQO\YHLOHGZDUQLQJWKDWFRXQWULHVOLNH)LQODQGRXJKWWRUHVLVWµFRPLQJXQGHUWKH
LQÀXHQFH¶RI:HVWHUQSRZHUV VXJJHVWV$XJHQWKDOHU¶V FRPPHQWV DQGRWKHUV OLNH LW
were somewhat bombastic.$QG WKHUH LV DOVR HYLGHQFH WR VXJJHVW WKDW IDU IURP
ZHOFRPLQJ )LQQLVK ()7$ PHPEHUVKLS 6RYLHW OHDGHU 1LNLWD .KUXVKFKHY LQ IDFW
RULJLQDOO\UHMHFWHGDQ\VXFKPRYHHYHQDSSHDULQJWRFDQFHODSODQQHGPHHWLQJLQ
+HOVLQNL DVD UHVSRQVH WR6XNVHODLQHQ¶VDQQRXQFHPHQW31%XWZKDWHYHU WKH UHDOLW\




















Integration 1945–95”. Contemporary European History9ROXPH  1XPEHU   ±












HQVXUHGWKDW)LQODQGZDVGHQLHGREVHUYHUVWDWXVDW6DOWVM|EDGHQ36 Within months, 
KRZHYHUVRPHWKLQJSURIRXQGKDGFOHDUO\WDNHQSODFH)RUZKHQRQ1RYHPEHU
+HOVLQNL IRUPDOO\ UHTXHVWHG FRQVXOWDWLRQV ZLWK WKH 6HYHQ WKH\ QRZ µZDUPO\
ZHOFRPHG¶WKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRGLVFXVVµWKHIRUPDQGRQZKDWFRQGLWLRQVDVWRULJKWVDQG




DWWHQWLRQWR)LQODQGZLWKRXWLWVHQWU\REVWUXFWLQJWKHDGYDQFHVPDGH It also helped 
WKDW)LQODQG¶V1RUGLFSDUWQHUVDQG6ZHGHQLQSDUWLFXODUKDGUHOHQWOHVVO\SUHVVHGWKH
FDVHIRULWVLQYROYHPHQWLQWKHSUHFHGLQJPRQWKV$FRPPLWPHQWWR1RUGLFVROLGDULW\





trade infrastructure. ,Q UHWURVSHFW LWKDGDSSHDUHG OLNHO\ WKDW WKHZRUVW H൵HFWVRI
this discrimination would be allayed by the creation of a Nordic Common Market 









)ULKDQGHOVRPUnGHW ± 8' 6ZHGLVK 1DWLRQDO $UFKLYHV 5LNVDUNLYHW 6WRFNKROP
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:KDW6FDQGLQDYLDQPRWLYHVFKLHÀ\UHÀHFWHG WKRXJKZDVDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI
WKHEURDGHU&ROG:DULPSOLFDWLRQVRI)LQODQG¶VH[FOXVLRQIURP()7$7KLVUHDVRQLQJ
was articulated most forcefully by the Swedish Minister of Trade, Gunnar Lange, 
GXULQJ 6WRFNKROP¶V VXPPHU GLSORPDWLF R൵HQVLYH LQ ZKLFK LW WULHG WR FRQYLQFH
GRXEWHUVDPRQJWKH6HYHQRIWKHFDVHIRU)LQODQG¶VHQWU\
6ZHGHQ¶VZKROHDWWLWXGHWRZDUGV)LQODQGGHSHQGVRQPDLQWDLQLQJLWVHFRQRPLF




7KH XSVKRW RI 6ZHGHQ¶V SRVLWLRQ ZDV WKDW KRZHYHU IUDXJKW QHJRWLDWLRQV ZLWK
+HOVLQNLPLJKW SURYH DQG KRZHYHUPXFK RI D ULVN WKH )LQQR6RYLHW QH[XVPLJKW
ZHOO EH RYHUULGLQJ DOO WKLVZDV WKH VWUDWHJLF LPSHUDWLYH WR KDYH )LQODQGZHGGHG
economically to the West.
2Q WKLVPDWWHU WKH6ZHGHV UHFHLYHGH[WHQVLYH VXSSRUW IURP WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
2XWZDUGO\ DW OHDVW LW PLJKW KDYH VHHPHG LPSODXVLEOH WKDW :DVKLQJWRQ ZRXOG
JLYHPXFK WKRXJKW WR WKHPDWWHU$IWHUDOO LWZDVZHOONQRZQDW WKH WLPH WKDW WKH
Americans were decidedly cool to EFTA itself.43 %XW HTXDOO\ WKH 86 DSSHDUV WR
KDYHYLHZHGDVFUXFLDO)LQODQG¶VFRQWLQXHGVWDWXVDVDQHXWUDOVWDWH)LQODQGDIWHU
DOO KDG ORQJ EHHQ VSRNHQ RI VWUDWHJLFDOO\ DV WKH SULPDU\ EX൵HU DJDLQVW D 6RYLHW
LQYDVLRQRI WKHHQWLUH6FDQGLQDYLDQSHQLQVXOD$QGV\PEROLFDOO\ LWV LQGHSHQGHQFH
ZDVUHJDUGHGDVWKHXOWLPDWHLOOXVWUDWLRQRIUHVLVWDQFHWR6RYLHWSRZHU44 Already by 
-DQXDU\DFRPELQDWLRQRI)LQODQG¶V LQFUHDVHGUHOLDQFHRQH[SRUWV WR(DVWHUQ
Europe, the strong electoral performance of the Finnish communist party, and a steep 
ULVHLQXQHPSOR\PHQWKDGOHGWKH861DWLRQDO6HFXULW\&RXQFLO16&WRFRQFOXGH
this status was under threat.45 'HYHORSPHQWV VHHPHG RQO\ WR UHLQIRUFH WKLV YLHZ
$PRQJWKHPRUHVHULRXVZHUH)LQODQG¶VJURZLQJGHSHQGHQFHRQ(DVWHUQEORFIXHO
UHVRXUFHVDUHQHZHGFUDFNGRZQRQDQWL6RYLHWSUHVVVSOLWVLQWKH:HVWHUQOHDQLQJ
42  +DQNH\ WR)2 WHOQR$XJXVW771$6HHDOVRDI0DOPERUJ
±
43  +ROOLGD\QRWH1RYHPEHU)271$86KRVWLOLW\FDPHDVDUHVXOWRIWKHIHDU
that a new economic bloc would undermine the EEC, weaken the cohesion of Western Europe, 











DQGWKHUHVXOWDQW6RYLHWHFRQRPLFEORFNDGHRI)LQODQG46 According to a July 1959 




WKLV WUHQG 3HULRGLFDOO\ DIWHU  DQG DJDLQ LQ  :DVKLQJWRQ KDG R൵HUHG
Finland targeted economic assistance in the form of loans, funnelled through the 
:RUOG%DQNIRULQGXVWULHVOLNHZRRGZRUNLQJDQGVKLSEXLOGLQJ*LYHQWKHVHHDUOLHU
H൵RUWVLWZDVXQFOHDUZKDWIXUWKHU¿QDQFLDODLGQRZZRXOGDFKLHYH Nor was it a 
JLYHQWKDW)LQODQGZRXOGRUFRXOGDFFHSWIXUWKHUDLG2QWKHFRQWUDU\GHYHORSPHQWV
VXFKDVWKHODXQFKRIWKH6SXWQLNVDWHOOLWHLQ2FWREHUDQGWKH1RYHPEHU










LWZLOO EHDPDMRU VWHS WRZDUG UHDO LQGHSHQGHQFHDQG WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI
46  )RU$PHULFDQDVVHVVPHQWVRIWKHVHHYHQWVFRUS ±9ROXPH;3DUW'RFXPHQW
+LFNHUVRQWR6WDWHFRUS ±9ROXPH;3DUW'RFXPHQW+LFNHUVRQ
WR6WDWHFRUS ±9ROXPH;3DUW'RFXPHQW(OEULFN WR+HUWHU
FRUS ±9ROXPH;3DUW 'RFXPHQW+DUYH\ WR6WDWH 
FRUS±9ROXPH;3DUW'RFXPHQW+LFNHUVRQWR6WDWH)RUEDFN-
JURXQG RQ WKHVH GHYHORSPHQWV PRUH JHQHUDOO\ VHH IRU LQVWDQFH$DSSR .lK|QHQ The Soviet 
8QLRQ)LQODQGDQGWKH&ROG:DU7KH)LQQLVK&DUGLQ6RYLHW)RUHLJQ3ROLF\±6.6
+HOVLQNL-XVVL0+DQKLPlNL6FDQGLQDYLDDQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV$Q,QVHFXUH)ULHQGVKLS. 







49  FRUS ±9ROXPH;3DUW'RFXPHQW+LFNHUVRQWR6WDWH)RUPRUH
RQKRZ WKHVH HYHQWV LQÀXHQFHG6RYLHW)LQQLVK WLHV5LVWR( - 3HQWWLOl)LQODQG¶V 6HDUFK IRU
6HFXULW\WKURXJK'HIHQFH±3DOJUDYH0DFPLOODQ1HZ<RUN±




$ UHDGLQJRI+LFNHUVRQ¶V FRUUHVSRQGHQFHVGRDGPLWWHGO\ UHYHDO DGLSORPDWSURQH
WRSHVVLPLVP6RVHHPLQJO\ZLGHVSUHDGZDVWKLVOLQHRIUHDVRQLQJKRZHYHUWKDWKLV
successor, Edson O. Sessions, would think much the same.51 And by 14 October 
3UHVLGHQW'ZLJKW(LVHQKRZHUKLPVHOIDSSURYHGDQXSGDWHG16&SROLF\GRFXPHQW




86QHHGHG WR µVXSSRUW H൵RUWVGLUHFWHGDW FORVHUFRRSHUDWLRQEHWZHHQ)LQODQGDQG
RWKHU:HVW(XURSHDQ FRXQWULHV SDUWLFXODUO\ WKRVH RI 6FDQGLQDYLD¶ZLWK D YLHZ WR
µUHGXFLQJ)LQODQG¶V VHQVHRI LVRODWLRQ DQG VWUHQJWKHQLQJ LWV FRQ¿GHQFH LQ GHDOLQJ
ZLWK WKH8665¶52 The Americans, in other words, appeared to champion Finnish 
LQFOXVLRQ LQ WKH :HVWHUQ (XURSHDQ LQWHJUDWLRQ H൵RUWV RI WKH V VHHPLQJO\
UHFRJQLVHG()7$DVWKHPRVWDSSURSULDWHIRUXPLQZKLFKWRGRVRDQGZHUHHYHQ
prepared somehow to assist to make sure it happened.
*LYHQZKDWZDVDWVWDNHWKH$PHULFDQVORVWOLWWOHWLPHLQFRQYH\LQJWKHLUWKLQNLQJ
WR WKH6HYHQ86R൶FLDOV IRU LQVWDQFHPDGHJRRGXVH RI1$72¶V1RUWK$WODQWLF
&RXQFLOWRYRLFHDQ[LHWLHVRYHUSHUFHLYHGJURZLQJ6RYLHWLQÀXHQFH53,Q1RYHPEHU
WKH86(PEDVV\LQ6WRFNKROPWKHQQRWL¿HGWKH6ZHGLVKJRYHUQPHQWGLUHFWO\DERXW
ZKDW LW UHJDUGHGDVERWK WKHSROLWLFDOPHULWVRI)LQODQG¶V MRLQLQJ()7$DQGPRUH
SRLQWHGO\ WKH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ZKLFK IHOO RQ WKH6HYHQ VZLIWO\ WR RSHQQHJRWLDWLRQV
ZLWK+HOVLQNL547KDW%ULWDLQ¶V$PEDVVDGRUWR:DVKLQJWRQ6LU+DUROG&DFFLDZRXOG
ZULWH D WHOHJUDP WKDW VDPHPRQWK LPSORULQJ KLV JRYHUQPHQW WR µGHPRQVWUDWH E\
DSSURSULDWH DFWLRQ¶ WKDW µ()7$ LV QRW RQO\ KDUPIXO WR >86@ LQWHUHVWV EXW LQ IDFW
SRVLWLYHO\ KHOSIXO¶ VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH%ULWLVKZHUH DOPRVW FHUWDLQO\ JLYHQ WKH VDPH
message.55(YHQLIQRWDFRQVHQVXVGLGQHYHUWKHOHVVEHJLQWRHPHUJHLQ:KLWHKDOO
WKDW VXSSRUW IRU )LQQLVK PHPEHUVKLS PLJKW EROVWHU ()7$¶V VWDWXUH ZLWKLQ WKH
  FRUS±9ROXPH;3DUW'RFXPHQW+LFNHUVRQWR6WDWH
51  E.g. FRUS±9ROXPH;3DUW'RFXPHQW6HVVLRQVWR6WDWH
52  FRUS±9ROXPH;3DUW'RFXPHQW6WDWHPHQWRI863ROLF\7RZDUG)LQODQG
16&
53  6HH LH &RPPLWWHH RI 3ROLWLFDO$GYLVRUV7UHQGV DQG ,PSOLFDWLRQV RI 6RYLHW 3ROLF\$&










:LWK WKH VKHHU YDULHW\ RI FKDOOHQJHV SUHVHQWHG E\ D )LQQLVK ELG LW ZDV SHUKDSV
LQHYLWDEOH WKDW D GHJUHH RI FDXWLRQ ZRXOG UHPDLQ DWWDFKHG WR WKH ZKROH LVVXH
&HUWDLQO\ WKH 6FDQGLQDYLDQV PDGH REYLRXV WKHLU GHVSRQGHQFH RYHU UXPRXUV WKDW
Britain remained lukewarm on enlargement. 1RU RQ FORVHU H[DPLQDWLRQ ZHUH
WKHVHFRPSODLQWVHQWLUHO\XQMXVWL¿HG$SSDUHQWIURPDUHDGLQJRI)RUHLJQ2൶FHDQG
7UHDVXU\¿OHV LQGHHG LV WKDW D FULWLFDOPDVV RI8.SROLF\PDNHUVZRXOG IRU VRPH
WLPHUHPDLQDGDPDQWWKDWWKHEHQH¿WVDFFUXHGIURPKHOSLQJ)LQODQGWRPDLQWDLQKHU
links with the West were unlikely to outstrip the sort of risks already mentioned 
DERYH0RUHJHQHUDOO\KRZHYHU WKHUHZDVDPRUHVXEVWDQWLDO%ULWLVKUHFRJQLWLRQ





ZRXOGPHDQZKLOH DJUHH DPRQJ WKHPVHOYHV WKH SURFHGXUDO DVSHFWV LQYROYHG SULRU
WR WZR IXUWKHU()7$)LQODQGH[SORUDWRU\PHHWLQJVKHOGRQ -DQXDU\DQG
February.61 It was here that responsibility for negotiating with Finland was handed 
WRWKHSHUVRQ3UHSDUDWRU\&RPPLWWHHOHGE\6ZHGHQ¶V,QJHPDU+lJJO|IZKLFK
KDG DOUHDG\ EHHQ VHW XS ()7$¶V RZQ LQVWLWXWLRQV62 From these discussions also 
HPHUJHGWKHVXJJHVWLRQWKDW2ODYL0XQNNL±WKHKHDGRI WKHIRUHLJQWUDGHVHFWLRQ






  0DNLQV WR *RUH%RRWK  7  71$ %XVK WR %ULVWRZ  )2
71$%DUFOD\PLQXWH)271$
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RI WKH6WRFNKROP&RQYHQWLRQ IURPZKLFK)LQODQGZRXOGPRVW H[SHFW WR GHYLDWH






DEOH WRDVVHUW WKDWZKLOH µVHYHUDOGL൶FXOWLHV¶ UHTXLUHGDWWHQWLRQ)LQODQG¶VHQWU\ WR
EFTA was both desirable and feasible.64




a state could associate with EFTA (Paragraph 2) or apply to join in full (Paragraph 
 7KH )LQQLVK WKHPVHOYHV VHHPHG XQVXUH RI ZKLFK URXWH WR WDNH 6SHDNLQJ WR
$PHULFDQ8QGHUVHFUHWDU\RI6WDWH'RXJODV'LOORQ)LQODQG¶V)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHU5DOI
7|UQJUHQKDGVSHFXODWHGWKDWRQO\µDNLQGRIDVVRFLDWHPHPEHUVKLSLQWKH6HYHQ¶




DOPRVWFHUWDLQO\JLYHQJUHDWHUXUJHQF\WRUHVROYLQJWKLVTXHVWLRQZLWKKDVWH As Roy 
$OOLVRQ¶VGHWDLOHGVWXG\RI)LQQR6RYLHWUHODWLRQVGHPRQVWUDWHVWKHWHQRURI6RYLHW
policy had appeared to morph from complete hostility to the mere suggestion of 
)LQODQGDFFHGLQJWRWKH6HYHQLQWRDVRPHZKDWVRIWHUWRQH$VPXFKZDVFRQ¿UPHG
LQ WKH2FWREHU SXEOLF D൶UPDWLRQE\'HSXW\6RYLHW3ULPH0LQLVWHU$QDVWDV
0LNR\DQWKDW)LQODQG¶VHQWU\LQWR()7$ZDVDGHFLVLRQIRUSROLWLFLDQVLQ+HOVLQNL
DQG QRW0RVFRZ DOEHLW RQ WKH SURYLVR WKDW )LQODQG GLG QRWKLQJ WR µZHDNHQ WKH
FRQGLWLRQVIRUWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI)LQQLVK6RYLHWWUDGH¶7KLVQHFHVVLWDWHGDOHYHO
RISROLWLFNLQJRQWKHSDUWRIWKH6HYHQ2QWKHRQHKDQGWKHFKDQFHRIWKH6RYLHWV










  Roy Allison, )LQODQG¶V5HODWLRQVZLWKWKH6RYLHW8QLRQ0DFPLOODQ/RQGRQ
16 Matthew Broad
statement thought still much too real to warrant full membership.69 0RWLYDWHG




to sit as a member of an enlarged Council, one of eight states of equal standing 
HDFKZLWKDYRWHRQSROLF\PDWWHUVDQGWKHULJKWWRFKDLU&RXQFLOVHVVLRQV,QUHWXUQ
)LQQLVK UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVZRXOG YRZ QRW WR YHWR DQ\ GHFLVLRQ RWKHUZLVH VXSSRUWHG
E\ WKH 6HYHQ ,Q VXFK FLUFXPVWDQFHV WKDW WKH\ GLG )LQODQGZRXOG EH H[SHFWHG WR






like liquid and solid fuels.2QWDUL൵V$UWLFOH0XQNNLKDGEHHQDWSDLQVWRVWUHVV
WKDW FHUWDLQ LQGXVWULHV ± LQ SDUWLFXODU WH[WLOHV PHWDO SURGXFHUV DQGZRRGZRUNLQJ




remain in place. Doing otherwise would generate unemployment, draw the wrath of 
WUDGHXQLRQV DQG µZRXOGKDYH VHULRXV LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU WKHFRPPXQLVWYRWH¶ As 





British, by contrast, a ten-year transitional period and escape clause, both already 
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E\+lJJO|I)XQGDPHQWDOO\WKRXJKLWZDVWKHSROLWLFDOSDOOKDQJLQJRYHUWKHWDONV
ZKLFK VDZ WKH 6HYHQ JLYH JURXQG 7KH UHVXOW ZDV WKDW TXDQWLWDWLYH UHVWULFWLRQV
ZRXOGUHPDLQEXWEHNHSWXQGHUUHYLHZ$QGZKLOHVSHFL¿FSURGXFWVZRXOGQRWEH
OLVWHG DV H[HPSWXQGHU$UWLFOH FRPSDUHG WR WKH6HYHQ)LQODQGZRXOGEHJLYHQ
DQH[WUDWZR\HDUV±XQWLO-DQXDU\±WRHOLPLQDWHLWVLQGXVWULDOWDUL൵VZLWKWKH
schedule for reductions phased more slowly.
%XR\HGE\WKLVPRPHQWXPWKH6HYHQDQG)LQODQGZHUHDEOHWR¿QDOLVHWKHWHUPV
RIDQDVVRFLDWLRQDQGSUHVHQWLW WRPLQLVWHUVDW WKH()7$&RXQFLO LQ/LVERQRQ
May.<HW LWZRXOGEHPLVWDNHQ WR UHJDUG WKLVDVDPDMRUDGYDQFH)RU0XQNNL¶V
VWDWHPHQW WR WKH&RXQFLO ± WKDWQHJRWLDWLRQVKDG VKRZQ LWZDV µSRVVLEOH WR FUHDWH
DQDVVRFLDWLRQ¶EXW WKDW WKHUHZDV µQRJHQHUDO VROXWLRQ¶ WR WKH0)1TXHVWLRQDQG
hence he would delay initialling the so-called Lisbon Draft Agreement (LDA) until 
further notice – was a sobering reminder of the constraints acting on Finland.8QWLO
WKLVSRLQW0XQNNLKDGDVVXUHGWKH6HYHQWKDWWKHUHZDVDJRRGFKDQFHWKH6RYLHWV
FRXOGEHSHUVXDGHGQRWWRHQIRUFHWKHLU0)1FODLP%LODWHUDOWDONVEHWZHHQ+HOVLQNL








  +lJJO|I ZDV GHVFULEHG E\ %ULWLVK OHDG GHOHJDWH 6LGQH\ *ROW DV KDYLQJ DFWHG µUHDOO\





great political importance both to Finland and to the West, and we must do all we can to ensure 
WKDW WKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUDQ\IDLOXUHLVQRWODLGDWRXUGRRU¶-DFNOLQJWR2ZHQ)2
71$6HHDOVR-HQVHQ(ULNVHQ±












QHJRWLDWLQJZLWKKHURQWKH0)1TXHVWLRQ¶ And Munkki himself would later claim 
WKDW.KUXVKFKHY¶V µLQWHQWLRQKDGEHHQ WRSHUVXDGH WKH)LQQV WRDEVWDLQ IURPWKHLU
SODQQHGFRRSHUDWLRQZLWKWKH()7$JURXS¶
:KDWHYHU WKH UHDVRQ0XQNNL¶V FRPPHQWV DW WKH0D\()7$&RXQFLO VSDUNHG
R൵DQHDUWRWDOGHDGORFNZKLFKZRXOGODVWVHYHUDOPRQWKV1RWXQWLOWKHDXWXPQGLG
talks between Finland and EFTA resume.(YHQWKHQWKH)LQQLVKJDYHQRLQGLFDWLRQ
RIKDYLQJEHHQDEOHWRUHDFKDVROXWLRQZLWKWKH6RYLHWV2QWKHFRQWUDU\KLVYLVLW
WR WKH6HFUHWDULDW LQ*HQHYDRQ2FWREHU VDZ0XQNNLRXWOLQHSODQV WR VROYH WKH
0)1TXHVWLRQE\REWDLQLQJD*$77ZDLYHUDQLGHDTXLFNO\VKRWGRZQDVWRREURDG









8QVXUSULVLQJO\ ()7$ UHVSRQGHGZLWK GLVPD\ ERUGHULQJ RQ LQGLJQDWLRQ (YHQ
)LQODQG¶VPRUH DUGHQW VXSSRUWHUV ZHUH YRFDOO\ FULWLFDO WR WKH SRLQW RI GLVFXVVLQJ
RSHQO\ZKHWKHUWKH6HYHQFRXOGOLYHZLWKWKH)LQQLVK6RYLHWWUDGHDJUHHPHQWDQG
E\ LPSOLFDWLRQ)LQODQG¶V DVVRFLDWLRQZLWK()7$7KH6ZHGHVZRXOG IRU LQVWDQFH
WHUPWKHDJUHHPHQWµZKROO\REMHFWLRQDEOH¶'HQPDUN¶VKHDGGHOHJDWH1LHOV6NDN
1LHOVHQ ZHQW IXUWKHU WKH 6HYHQ KH WROG 0XQNNL GLUHFW µZRXOG EH REOLJHG WR
UHFRQVLGHUWKHLUHQWLUHSRVLWLRQ>RQ@WKHGUDIWDJUHHPHQWIRUWKHDVVRFLDWLRQRI)LQODQG
ZLWK()7$¶7KH$XVWULDQV IRU WKHLU SDUW VSHFXODWHGZKHWKHU WKH YLUWXDOO\ RQH
VLGHGH[WHQVLRQRI()7$PHPEHUVKLSWRWKH6RYLHW8QLRQZRXOGQRWQRZFRQWUDYHQH
  +HOVLQNLWR)2QR)271$





  ,ELG'HSXW\6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO WR+HDGVRI'HOHJDWLRQV6*1 ()7$
+$(87KH6HFUHWDULDWZDV()7$¶VDGPLQLVWUDWLYHDUPEDVHGLQ*HQHYDRYHUVHHLQJWKHGD\WR







19Transatlantic Relations and Finland’s Application to the European...
the State Treaty upon which its own neutrality was predicated. To this was added 
%ULWDLQ¶V(GJDU&RKHQ¶VUHPDUNWKDWLWZDVµLPSRUWDQWDQGXUJHQWWREULQJDOOSUHVVXUH
on Finnish ministers to dissuade them from entering into an agreement that EFTA 
FRXOGQRWDFFHSW¶91
$VWKHVKRFNVXEVLGHGKRZHYHULWVRRQEHFDPHDSSDUHQWWKDWWKH6HYHQ¶VRSWLRQV







UXOHV %ORFNLQJ WKH )LQQLVK IURP MRLQLQJ ()7$ WKHUHIRUH SURPLVHG WR VROYH YHU\





reality which would need to be accommodated. Precisely how to do this was, though, 
QRHDV\WDVN$V()7$¶VLQDXJXUDO6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO)UDQN)LJJXUHVVSHOWRXWLQD



















96  $VVRFLDWLRQ RI )LQODQGZLWK ()7$1RWH E\ WKH 6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO WR+HDGV RI'HOHJDWLRQV
()7$6*1()7$+$(8
 Matthew Broad
policymaking machinery, would instead be necessary. Numerous options were 










LDA remained much the same.99 Other suggestions, though, were much more radical 
LQVFRSH,QEHLQJVRWKH\VHUYHGWRKLJKOLJKWMXVWKRZLQWHQVHVWLOOZDVWKHGHJUHH
of hostility to Finnish actions. Perhaps most drastic was the Swiss draft calling for 
DPXFKZHDNHU IUHH WUDGH DUUDQJHPHQW JRYHUQHG E\ DQ DG KRF OLDLVRQ FRPPLWWHH
ZKLFKLIHQDFWHGZRXOGKDYHH൵HFWLYHO\YHWRHG)LQQLVK()7$PHPEHUVKLSLQDOO
but name.1RUGLG WKH3RUWXJXHVH DSSHDU WREH IDQVRI)LQQLVKEHKDYLRXU2QH








DVVRFLDWLRQ <HW WKH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK WKLV PDWWHUHG ZDV QRW LPPHGLDWHO\ FHUWDLQ
$IWHU DOO UH¿QHPHQWV WR WKH/'$ DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQQRYDWLRQVZRXOG LQ SUDFWLFH
FRXQWIRUOLWWOHLI*$77GLGQRW¿UVWVDQFWLRQ)LQODQG¶VPHPEHUVKLSRI()7$DQG
DVSDUWRI WKLVFRPHWRDFFHSW LWV WUDGHDJUHHPHQWZLWK WKH6RYLHW8QLRQ$VZDV
HYLGHQFHGE\UHSHDWHGVWDWHPHQWV&RKHQPDGHWRKLVIHOORZ+HDGVRI'HOHJDWLRQVLI
LWV&RQWUDFWLQJ3DUWLHVFRXOGVXFFHVVIXOO\GHPRQVWUDWH)LQODQG¶V0)1FRPPLWPHQW
WR WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQZDV D VROLWDU\ H[FHSWLRQ XQOLNHO\ WR EH WROHUDWHG HOVHZKHUH
  $VVRFLDWLRQ RI )LQODQG ZLWK ()7$ ,QIRUPDO 0HHWLQJ RI 0LQLVWHUV LQ 3DULV 
()7$+$(8




  $VVRFLDWLRQ RI )LQODQG ZLWK ()7$ 6ZLVV :RUNLQJ 3DSHU ()7$6*1  
()7$+$(8
  5HFRUGRI+HDGVRI'HOHJDWLRQV0HHWLQJ()7$+2'()7$+$(8
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*$77PLJKWDOVRHPHUJHDV WKHEHVWPHWKRGWKURXJKZKLFKWR LQVXODWH WKH6HYHQ
IURP6RYLHWSUHVVXUH(PSKDVLVWKHUHIRUHSRLQWHGLQFUHDVLQJO\WRGHYLVLQJD*$77
VROXWLRQDVDSRVVLEOH¿[IRUWKH()7$VWDOHPDWH
7KLV LQHYLWDEO\ GUHZ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV EDFN LQWR WKH FRQYHUVDWLRQ 7KH 6WDWH
'HSDUWPHQW DQG86 (PEDVV\ LQ+HOVLQNL KDG LQ IDFW EHHQ FORVHO\ IROORZLQJ WKH
WZLVWVDQGWXUQVRI)LQODQG¶VQHJRWLDWLRQVZLWKWKH6HYHQWKURXJKRXWDQGKDG
speculated as early as February that some sort of accommodation for Finland inside 
GATT might be required.6HVVLRQVKDGPRUHRYHU IRXQG LWQHFHVVDU\GXULQJ WKH






FRPPXQLVW IRRWKROG LQ WKH WUDGHXQLRQPRYHPHQW$OO WKLV OHG WKH$PEDVVDGRU WR











FXOWXUDO YLVLWV RI ZHOONQRZQ (XURSHDQ ¿JXUHV WR )LQODQGZLWK D YLHZ RI HDVLQJ
any sense of isolation from the West.:KHQE\1RYHPEHUZRUGFDPHWKURXJKRI
)LQODQG¶VLQWHQWLRQWRFRQ¿UPLWV0)1WUHDWPHQWRI6RYLHWWUDGHLWGLGQRWWDNHPXFK
WRWUDQVODWHWKLVH[LVWLQJVFKHPHLQWRDUHDGLQHVVWRµHQVXUHVRPHIRUPRIDVVRFLDWLRQ














once more resorted to the lower key method of working with EFTA members on 
UHVROYLQJWKH0)1LVVXHLQ*$77 On 1 December, Dillon met informally with 
%ULWDLQ¶V&KDQFHOORURIWKH([FKHTXHU6HOZ\Q/OR\GZKHUHKHUHIHUHQFHGWKHµWKH
RYHUULGLQJLPSRUWDQFHRISROLWLFDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQV¶UHJDUGLQJ)LQODQGDQGFRQ¿UPHG
WKDW WKH86ZRXOGZRUNµEHKLQG WKHVFHQHV¶ LQ*$77WRHQVXUHµDFTXLHVFHQFH¶RI
WKH)LQQR6RYLHWWUDGHDJUHHPHQW Within weeks, Cohen had informed his fellow 
+HDGVRI'HOHJDWLRQVRI'LOORQ¶V UHPDUNV([SODLQLQJ WKDWZLWK86 VXSSRUW WKHUH
ZDVQRZDUHDOLVWLFFKDQFHRIVROYLQJWKH0)1LVVXH&RKHQUHPLQGHGKLVFROOHDJXHV




trade. In light of this clarion call, Norway agreed to approach France and West 
Germany. Sweden would speak to Latin American countries like Brazil. And Britain 








D¿QDOUXOLQJRQWKHWHUPVRI WKH WUHDW\ZRXOGEHSRVWSRQHGDOPRVW LQGH¿QLWHO\111 
$OUHDG\ZHOOEHIRUHWKLVGDWHKRZHYHUWKH+HDGVRI'HOHJDWLRQVKDGUHFRPPHQGHG



















ZHUH DOVR OHVV WKDQ VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG4XLWH WKHRSSRVLWH LQ IDFW()7$VWDWHV
DSSHDUWRKDYHEHHQUHWLFHQWWRDFFHSW)LQQLVKHQWU\DWDQ\SULFH)URPWKH0D\()7$





in which negotiations with Finland were taking place. Put another way, the response 
RI WKH6HYHQSXVKLQJIRUZDUGGHVSLWH WKHVHVHWEDFNVUHÀHFWHGDQDZDUHQHVV WKDW
ZKLOHWKHHFRQRPLFVKDGWREHULJKWLWZDVWKHSROLWLFVWKDWPRVWPDWWHUHG)LQODQG¶V
DVVRFLDWLRQZLWK()7$ZDVLQWKLVVHQVHERUQRI&ROG:DUG\QDPLFV%XW()7$¶V
KDQGOLQJ RI )LQQLVK PHPEHUVKLS DOVR UHÀHFWHG WKH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK WUDQVDWODQWLF
relations were key to unblocking the integrationist logjams that occurred along the 
ZD\,W LVGHEDWDEOHIRUH[DPSOHZKHWKHUZLWKRXW86LQWHUYHQWLRQDOOVHYHQ()7$
VWDWHVPLJKWKDYHEHHQVRSUHSDUHGWRLQLWLDWHLQIRUPDOWDONVZLWKWKH)LQQVLQ2FWREHU
:LWKRXW86LQWHUYHQWLRQWRRLWORRNVDVWKRXJKWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOGLVSXWHVRI
1RYHPEHU'HFHPEHUDQG-DQXDU\ZRXOGKDYHJRQHRQWRRYHUZKHOPWKH
$VVRFLDWLRQ7RWKLVHQG)LQODQG¶VDVVRFLDWLRQZLWK()7$ZDVDVPXFKERUQRI86
LQÀXHQFH
